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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this paper is to highlight the impact of ownership discrepancy and type 
(managers, families, institutions) on executive compensation. Based on a sample of French listed 
firms and using panel data regressions, the results show that capital concentration (Jensen 1986) 
negatively affects both the level of total executive compensation and the probability of use of stock 
option incentive plans. This confirms our theoretical alignment hypothesis. Moreover, the results 
show no evidence of the existence of a significant effect of ownership discrepancy on managerial 
compensation. Institutional shareholders are likely to encourage the use of stock option incentive 
plans and managerial ownership positively and significantly influences the level of total and fixed 
compensation. Family shareholding negatively affects executive compensation variables. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he issue of executive compensation has been the subject of much debate by several regulators. The 
special attention paid to the incentive mechanisms of managers has also stimulated the interest of 
several researchers to examine the link between business performance and the amount of 
compensation granted to executives. 
  
The study of executive compensation is generally seen in the context of the agency relationship. The basic 
paradigm of the latter comes from the separation of management and ownership in companies with diffuse 
ownership. This leads to a possible divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. The latter take 
advantage of their strategic position at the head of the firm and the associated managerial discretion to pursue their 
own goals rather than those of shareholders. To address this problem and reduce agency costs related thereto, the 
agency theory proposes the establishment of incentive mechanisms for effective managers. These mechanisms 
include, primarily, writing compensation contracts between owners and managers based on performance indicators 
of the company (Core and Larcker (2002)). 
  
While executive compensation is deemed to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders, it 
may lead, however, to significant deviations. Indeed, the financial scandals of recent years, paired with the growth 
of compensation plans, reveal that managers enjoy significant financial benefits even when their firm's performance 
is poor. Managerial compensation has seen significant examination in the context of the recent financial crisis, 
particularly due to the granting of executive bonuses at companies whose performance had deteriorated 
sharply. This type of controversy evokes the question of the role of governance mechanisms to control levels of 
managerial compensation that are sometimes deemed excessive (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998)). Among these 
mechanisms, we examine the shareholding structure while controlling for certain characteristics of the board. 
  
This study aims to examine the effect of the shareholding structure on managerial compensation in France 
while controlling for the impact of certain characteristics of the board, size, performance and debt. This research 
aims to extend a very sparse literature on the subject. In practical terms, the response to this problem allows us to 
T 
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identify the determinants of managerial compensation policy factors. Moreover, considering agency theory, we 
anticipate significant effects of the ownership structure and characteristics of the board structure on the managerial 
compensation system. This implies implicitly the existence of a potential substitution effect (negative effect on 
earnings) and/or complementarity (positive effect on earnings) between the compensation system, on the one hand, 
and shareholding structure and characteristics of the board of directors, on the other hand. 
  
Thus we refer to two theories, namely the theory of optimal contracts (Core and Larcker 2002) and the 
theory of managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). The first states that managerial compensation is considered 
to be a governance mechanism that can resolve potential agency conflicts between the shareholders and the 
manager. The second theory, for its part, holds that managerial compensation does not constitute a solution to the 
agency problem but may be the cause. Indeed, the manager could influence the decisions made by the board, 
including those related to compensation. Thus, two assumptions relating to the theories presented above are to be 
tested.  
The first, called alignment, states that capital concentration entails effective control of the policy of 
managerial compensation. Similarly, given its risk aversion, the manager could accept a low level of compensation 
in exchange for higher job security (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003, Ben Amoako-Adu, 2011). The second hypothesis 
states that the majority shareholder is able to try to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders through 
compensation (Bertrand and Schoar 2006; Croci et al., 2012). 
  
To identify critical variables of managerial compensation systems, we examine a sample of French 
companies belonging to the SBF 120 index. Our study period lasts four (4) years from 2007 to 2010. Note that the 
French context is interesting to analyze for various reasons. The first concerns the considerable evolution of 
governance mechanisms in recent years in France, including the Viénot reports 1995, 1999 and Button 2002. In 
addition, companies have multiplied the creation of specialized committees and, in particular, compensation 
committees. In this regard, we think that it is interesting to consider the impact of these new measures of governance 
on levels of executive compensation. 
  
The second reason comes from the fact that our knowledge of the political executive compensation system 
has been little studied in the French context. This can be explained by the fact that, until recently, information on 
this issue has not been available. Indeed, transparency on compensation has gradually developed over recent years 
(Wirtz (2009)). In this regard, the Viénot report (1999) encouraged the publication of details of managerial 
compensation in the case of listed French companies and stock option plans in the new economic regulations (NRE) 
of 15 May 2001. This establishes that the corporate proxy statement must account for the full pay, the granting of 
option purchase actions and benefits paid to each executive manager. The Breton Act of 26 July 2005 has enhanced 
transparency by requiring the inclusion in the annual report of a description of the fixed, variable and exceptional 
components of compensation, and the criteria under which they have been evaluated and the circumstances in virtue 
of which they were established. 
  
A third reason for the choice of the French context arises from its shareholding structure. Indeed, various 
studies agree on the highly concentrated nature of ownership in France and the frequent use of mechanisms that 
separate voting rights and shareholding rights. These studies also highlight the presence of three major shareholders: 
managers, families and institutions. 
  
The features of managerial compensation and ownership structure are behind the choice of our research 
question that propose to highlight the impact of the concentration of ownership, the separation between ownership 
and control, and the type of shareholder (managers, families, institutions) on executive compensation in French 
companies listed on the SBF 120 index. Simultaneously, we control the impact of certain variables of the board, 
performance, size and debt. The answer to this research question will, in the design of managerial compensation 
contracts, monitor the effect of certain key variables. 
 
To empirically test the hypothesis of our study, we adopt a regression-based approach. Our dependent 
variables are none other than the level of total fixed compensation and variable compensation (bonus) of the 
manager. We set the dependent variable equal to one (1) in a binary variable if the firm distributes stock options to 
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its managers. Our explanatory variables are mainly the shareholding structure. We also regress some variables 
representing the board. We control, too, for the effects of size, leverage and profitability. 
This article is organized as follows. The first section presents a literature review on the effect of ownership structure 
on executive compensation that permits us to develop the hypotheses of this study. Research methodology, sample 
and variable measurement are detailed in s a second section. We analyze the results of our empirical investigation in 
a third section. The last section concludes the paper. 
  
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The study of the relationship between nature and executive compensation constitutes a privileged and 
recent topic in the economic literature. Many studies have been carried out in order to test the hypothesis that 
ownership structure affects executive compensation. These studies support or oppose the conclusion reached by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This confirms the theory of optimal contracts (Core and Larcker 2002). In contrast, the 
so-called managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried 2003) theory holds that managerial compensation is not a solution 
to the agency problem but may be the cause. Indeed, the manager could influence the decisions made by the board 
of directors, including those related to compensation. 
  
2.1 Concentration Of Ownership And Executive Compensation 
  
Under the framework of the agency theory, the controlling shareholders are likely to play a particularly 
active role in the control of directors and in limiting the agency relationship between shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)) conflicts. In companies whose capital is diffuse, managers have considerable 
leeway to guide the decisions of the board and to get what they ask for in reporting earnings. Thus, in this type of 
business, the lack of control by a blockholder tends to increase the cost of incentive compensation. Moreover, when 
the capital is held by a small number of shareholders, the need for a significant level of compensation or the 
establishment of a political incentive is not feasible given risky management practices which are limited or even 
nonexistent. Indeed, blockholders are encouraged to invest in management control to ensure that they take 
ownership of a significant share of the additional profits (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). This call to action is to 
guarantee their effectiveness. It is also the least expensive in terms of agency cost caused by managerial discretion 
(Mtanios and Pequerot (1999)) costs. Since then, concentrated ownership has been one of the control mechanisms of 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). 
  
A large part of the financial literature is concerned with the pressure that can be applied by blockholders on 
managers to get them to the goal of maximizing the value of the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that the 
presence of controlling shareholders exercising closer supervision over the opportunistic behavior of managers helps 
in ensuring the reduction of their discretionary areas. Thus, the concentration of ownership appears as a guarantee of 
security for minority shareholders against the opportunism of manager. 
  
It follows that based on these arguments, ownership concentration negatively affects total executive 
compensation. The results of empirical studies on the concentration of ownership revealed, overall, a negative 
influence of the presence of controlling shareholders on executive compensation (Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) on the 
German market and Mehran (1995) on the U.S. market). These authors reflect this association to a substitution effect 
between the blockholders’ control and the payment of higher salaries to their executives. In this respect, and like 
other European countries, corporate governance in France is characterized by shareholder concentration (La Porta et 
al. (1999)) (Faccio and Lang (2002)). Thus, we expect that blockholders actively act for the control of managers, 
particularly in their compensation. Accordingly, we issue our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The percentage of capital held by the main non-executive shareholder negatively affects the level of 
executive compensation. 
  
2.2 Separation Of Ownership/Voting And Executive Compensation 
  
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon context, the majority of firms in the countries of continental Europe and Asia use 
mechanisms counteracting the "principle of one share-one vote". This dissociation between ownership and control is 
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effected through the issue of shares to multiple voting classes, the organization of firms in pyramid structures and 
cross-holdings (Bebchuk (1999), La Porta et al. (1999),  Faccio and Lang (2002)). As shown in Faccio and Lang 
(2002), examining a sample of 3,592 European firms, there is a divergence between the right to the capital and 
voting rights of the controlling shareholder holding more than 10% of the vote. These authors found that the 
blockholder has 34.60% of capital and 37.75% of capital vote. As an indication, the majority shareholder in Italy has 
averaged 38.33% against 48.26% of capital vote. In France the majority shareholder holds on average 46.68% 
against 48.32% of capital vote. 
  
The phenomenon of dissociation gives the holder of shares of multiple voting classes the ability to maintain 
an almost exclusive control of the company while holding very small part of capital. This situation benefits the 
expropriation of minority shareholders through the phenomenon of private benefits. Indeed, Boubaker and 
Labegorre (2006) show that excess control provides the majority shareholder the ability and incentive to make 
decisions that promote their interests and sometimes at the expense of maximizing shareholder value. It can, for 
example, not select the most profitable investment projects for all shareholders. In this regard, Johnson et al. (1996) 
note that the control exercised by blockholders is not necessarily a source of efficiency for the company, which 
might strengthen the majority-minority conflicts. 
  
The different impacts of the dissociation between ownership and control are less studied empirically, 
mainly because under U.S. law, this is nearly nonexistent in the United States. Recently, taking a sample of 150 U.S. 
firms during 1995-2003, Masulis et al. (2009) observe a positive association between executive compensation and 
excess control that is captured through two measures: the ratio of divergence (vote/capital) and "wedge" (vote-
capital).  
 
From a survey of 160 German firms, Haid  and Yurtoglu  (2006) found that excess control affects the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm size. Indeed, it appears that the «wedge» positively 
influences the high managerial compensation observed in large firms. However, no direct effect of this excess of 
control over executive compensation has been revealed. Excess control may pose a threat of expropriation of 
minority shareholders. We thus issue our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: a separation between ownership and control positively affects total executive compensation. 
  
2.3 Family Shareholders And Executive Compensation 
  
Family ties may have an impact on executive compensation ( Ben Amoako-Adu et al. (2011), Croci et 
al. (2012)). There are several reasons for this. Indeed, empirical evidence (Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001); Ben Amoako-
Adu et al. (2011); Croci et al. (2012)) suggests that managers who have family ties with the owner have high job 
security. 
  
In opposition to Beehr et al. (1997), a close head of the family has naturally two interrelated roles: a worker 
role (as a steward for the company) and the role of a non-worker (as the supervisor of the obligations of the 
family). As a reaction to this duality of roles, the manager belonging to a family business is rewarded with relatively 
secure employment (Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001); Croci et al. (2012)). Moreover, the literature on performance 
evaluation suggests that evaluators are more likely to attribute positive performance to employees because of 
bonding between supervisors and those who are judged. Thus, in companies controlled by families, board members 
(in their role as controller) may have less incentive to remunerate managers. Indeed, poor performance can then be 
interpreted as bad luck rather than the result of the incompetence of these managers. Applying the logic of agency 
theory, the above scenario suggests that within family-controlled businesses managers could exchange very high job 
security for low income if they have links with families. 
  
In this type of firm, the divergence of interests between principal (the family) and agent (the manager) is 
mitigated by the fact that there is an almost total confusion of property and control functions. This situation has led 
many theorists such as Fama and Jensen (1983) to suggest that, unlike firms with dispersed ownership, agency 
problems arising from conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders do not have a place or are 
insignificant in family businesses. This direct involvement of family members in the management of the firm affects 
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executive compensation, as they reduce their excessive withdrawals.  This inverse relationship can be observed in 
the light of the hypothesis of expropriation of private benefits. Indeed, the huge family involvement in the control 
and management of the firm is likely to provide freedom of discretionary action for managers to meet their own 
objectives to the detriment of the interests of other shareholders. The severity of this problem tends to increase in the 
presence of separation between ownership and control, particularly in the case of pyramidal structures. 
 
Moreover, based on a sample of Japanese firms during, Basu et al. (2007) concluded that family control 
tends to use its position to overpay these members as executives. These authors state that excessive compensation is 
a sign of lax governance. Similarly, other empirical studies in Italy by Barontini and Bozzi (2011) and in Germany 
by Haid  and Yurtoglu  (2006) validate this positive association. The ownership structure of firms in France is 
characterized by the presence of family groups as controlling (Faccio and Lang (2002)). Thus, we can propose our 
third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Family ownership positively affects total executive compensation. 
 
2.4 Shareholding Managers And Executive Compensation 
  
As part of the alignment hypothesis, the greater the share capital held by the manager, the higher his 
interests may be aligned with those of other shareholders, thereby limiting the risk of opportunistic managerial 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Consequently, a greater involvement of the executive in capital holding 
should limit the risk of an excessive compensation policy, to the detriment of shareholders. 
  
In the Anglo-Saxon context, Lambert et  al. (1993) and Core et al. (1999)  verify that the level of executive 
compensation is lower when the executives’ participation in capital holding is larger. One can also assume that the 
manager more readily accepts a greater share of flexible pay linked to company performance. Shareholding 
management has both positive and negative characteristics. When managers hold a small percentage of securities, 
the increase of that percentage can better align their interests with those of outside shareholders. Otherwise, the 
managers eventually pursue only their own interests, regardless of outside shareholders. However, it should be noted 
that the inverse relationship could be observed under the guise of a rooting hypothesis manager. Indeed, the theory 
of the existence of rooting suggests an active behavior to take advantage of loopholes or neutralize controls. This 
behavior allows a transfer of wealth from shareholders in favor of managers, particularly in the form of wages 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). 
 
In other words, holding a large share of capital would allow the manager to compel the directors to accept a 
compensation policy favoring their self-interest. Roussel and Trepo (1999) observe that in France and in companies 
where managers act on their compensation, bonuses are less tied to the performance of the company. Barak et al. 
(2011) confirm this positive association stating that excessive compensation has the effect of deterioration in the 
value of the firm.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of capital held by the manager positively affects their level of compensation. 
 
2.5 Ownership Of Institutional Investors And Executive Compensation 
  
According to the agency theory, institutional shareholder may serve as a mechanism for effective 
governance. Indeed, the augmentation of participation in corporate capital adds binding dimensions for managers in 
their opportunistic behavior. Mtanios and Paquerot (1999) argue that institutional investors exercise strict control 
over the management of the firm in which they invest through two levers: (1) They have privileged access to 
information because of their activities and many investments they make enable them to analyze in detail the 
accounts of the company, its growth prospects and quality of its management and (2) They have seats on the board 
and can therefore influence the decisions of managers in order to maximize the return on their investment. 
  
Ginglinger and L'Her (2006) state that the institutional shareholder is also a guarantee of protection of 
minority shareholders’s interests, when the ownership structure is dominated by a majority shareholder. Thus, they 
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will try to stop any behavior detrimental to their interest, in particular the phenomenon of private benefits. It follows 
that based on these arguments institutional ownership is inversely related to the total compensation of managers. 
  
Khan et al. (2005) study the impact of concentration and dispersion of institutional properties on the level 
of executive compensation. They point out that institutional concentration leads to a lower level of compensation. 
However, when dispersed, the level increases. According to these authors, institutional investors holding small units 
are not encouraged to collect internal company information to monitor managerial behavior because of its high 
cost. In this case, managers are free from control and exercise their discretion in order to assign a higher pay. Ozkan 
(2007) shows that the level of executive compensation is significantly and negatively related to institutional 
ownership concentration. This result is consistent with the theoretical literature on the role of principal 
shareholders. In other words, there is a substitution relationship between the influence of institutional investors to 
monitor management and compensation thereof. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Concentration of institutional ownership negatively affects executive compensation. 
  
3. METHODOLOGY 
  
Recall that we propose to study the impact of ownership on executive compensation structure in France, 
while controlling for the effect of certain variables of the Board, size, profitability and debt. 
  
3.1 Data And Sample  
 
This research is conducted on a sample of companies listed on the SBF 120 index. Of all the SBF 120 
companies listed during the period 2007-2010, we removed (1) companies that do not publish the individual and 
personal compensation of the CEO, (2) companies limited by shares because the managers are paid statutory profits, 
and (3) outliers identified by the level of compensation in addition to the stock options received by the executive in 
relation to the compensation of other executives of listed companies in the same index. Individuals whose 
compensation is very low or very high compared to the average are thus removed. To perform the analysis, 
information on executive compensation should be available over the four years of study. Our final sample consisted 
of 97 companies. The number of observations is thus about 388 company-year observations. 
 
For the purposes of this research, most of the information on the compensation of directors and managers 
was collected manually from annual reports (documents), published on the websites of the SBF 120 
companies. Data on governance variables were also collected from the annual reports of the companies 
concerned. Finally, financial and market data were extracted from the Worldscope data base. 
  
3.2 Executive Compensation Measure  
  
The terms of executive compensation are complex and pose empirical problems. The aggregate 
compensation of an manager is in fact the sum of four components, namely, (1) a fixed compensation, (2) an annual 
bonus, (3) options to purchase shares and /or bonus shares, and finally, (4) a set of various elements: fringe benefits, 
fees, insurance underwriting and severance pay. 
  
Fixed compensation: The dependent variable (LnRemFix it) is the natural logarithm of the fixed compensation in 
thousands of euros allocated to manager i. The fixed and variable compensation is measured as follows: Ln (fixed 
compensation it) (Croci et al. (2012).). 
 
The annual bonus: The variable (Bonus it) is the logarithm of the annual variable compensation (the short-term 
incentive) of the manager assigned to i paid in year t +1 t. The variable annual bonus is measured as follows: Ln 
(Annual Bonus it ) (Croci et al. (2012).). 
 
Total compensation: The global variable compensation (LnRemTot it) is the logarithm of the sum of the fixed salary 
and annual bonus (Croci et al. (2012).). 
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Stock Options: The representative of this variable (AttSo) is measured through a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm assigns stock options to its directors and 0 otherwise. 
  
3.3 Independent Variables  
 
The concentration of ownership : To measure the concentration of ownership, we use two types of measures. The 
first (Herfindahl) concerns the Herfindahl-Hirschman indicator proposed by Demsetz and Lehn (1965). The second 
(Conc), in turn, determines the share held by the largest shareholder in the capital structure. 
  
Discrepancy: The separation between ownership and control is measured by a variable (discrepancy) which is 
equal to the difference between the voting rights percentage of the top controlling shareholder and the rights to cash 
flow as a percentage of the top controlling shareholder. 
  
Manager ownership: This variable (KalDirig) is defined as the percentage of shares held by the CEO in the case of 
the combination of the functions of board chairman and chief executive manager or the percentage of shares held by 
the CEO in the event that these functions are separated. 
  
Family ownership: Family ownership is often associated with a wide involvement of the founders and other family 
members in positions of leadership within the company. The family shareholder (KalFlle) is measured by the 
percentage of shares held by family members. 
  
Institutional ownership: This variable (Invins) is defined as the percentage of shares held by French and foreign 
institutional investors. 
  
3.4 Control Variables  
 
The ownership structure is not the only determinant of executive compensation. The empirical literature 
highlights other factors that may influence the level of executive compensation. We then control for the effect of 
firm size (Smith and Watts (1992) and Core and Guay (1999)), performance (Benito and Conyon (1999)), debt 
(Jensen 1986), The percentage of independent directors on the board  (Core et al. (1999)), Cordeiro and Veliyath 
(2003) and Conyon et al. (1995). 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
  
To better understand the effect of ownership structure on executive compensation in fixed and variable 
form, while controlling for the effect of certain variables characterizing the Board, size, performance and debt, we 
adopt a multiple regression model using panel data. 
  
Our Probit model regress the binary variable representing granting of stock option (AttSo). Indeed, the 
dependent variable in this case is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the firm assigns stock options to its 
directors and 0 otherwise. Our regression models of the value of total compensation (LnRemTot), fixed 
compensation (LnRemFix) and bonus (Bonus Ln) are based on panel data. So, it is often useful to identify the 
effect associated with each individual that is common or specific. This effect can be fixed or random. Since we study 
the three forms of compensation (fixed, variable and total) and the possibility of awarding incentive plans based on 
options to purchase shares, we end with the analysis of 8 model regressions. 
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Table 1. The Model 
Equation Model Regression 
Equation1 
1 LnRemTot = f (Conc, Invins, KalDirig, IndCA, Duality, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
2 LnRemFix = f (Conc, Invins, KalDirig, IndCA, Duality, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
3 Bonus = f (Conc, Invins, KalDirig, IndCA, Duality LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
4 Attso = f (Conc, Invins, KalDirig, IndCA, Duality, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
Equation 2 
1 LnRemTot = f (Discrepancy, KalFlle, Herfindahl, Duality, IndCA, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
2 LnRemFix = f (Discrepancy, KalFlle, Herfindahl, Duality, IndCA, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
3 Bonus = f (Discrepancy, KalFlle, Herfindahl Duality, IndCA, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
4 Attso = f (Discrepancy, KalFlle, Herfindahl, Duality, IndCA, LnActif, ROE, Endt) 
  
5. ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
  
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, and independent control of our study. On 
average, a French manager receives a total compensation of 1,549,432 EUR. This compensation also comprises a 
fixed part on average of 632 to 764 EUR and an average variable component on the order of 745 497 EUR. The 
dispersion of the wage compensation is very pronounced. 
  
In terms of ownership structure, the largest shareholder holds on average 34.37% of the capital. This result 
confirms the thesis that the shareholding structure of French firms is relatively concentrated (Faccio and Lang 
(2002)).The Herfindahl concentration index confirms this result (the average is around 26.47%). These figures may 
reveal the existence of a potential conflict between majority and minority shareholders. This is all the more 
important since the French legal environment is not ready to protect minority shareholders because of its weak rules 
of legal protection and the ineffective law enforcement system (La Porta et al. (1998)). The gap in ownership/voting 
is an average of about 2.43%. In some cases, this gap reaches 21%. This is explained by the fact that in France, a 
large majority of companies use double voting rights. These rights, non-negotiable, are removed in case of transfer 
of the shares. This practice helps to strengthen control by majority shareholders by increasing the separation 
between cash flow rights and voting rights. 
  
Claessens et al. (2002) show that the difference between rights to cash flow and voting rights is accentuated 
for family firms in Asia. This result seems to be confirmed by Ginglinger and L'Her (2006) on a large sample of 
French firms conducting repurchases. These findings may explain the fact that the percentage of shares held by the 
family is on average equal to 9.62% in our sample. Table 3 also shows that, in the French context, on average 6.52% 
of the capital held by the managers. It should be noted also that the proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors is on average about 35.62%. It turns out that this type of powered ownership is, indeed, widespread in 
France. The increase in assets held by these investors leads them to become full participants in the systems of 
corporate governance. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for continuous and categorical variables in our sample. 
Continuous Variables Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Average 
Concent 0.0356 0.9993 0.2265 0.3437 
Discrepancy -0.1455 0.2128 0.0521 0.0243 
Herfindhal 
KalFlle 
0.0006 
0 
17.64 
0.8098 
0.9607 
0.1675 
0.2647 
0.0962 
Invins 0 0914 0.2637 0.3562 
KalDirig 
IndCA 
0 
0.1111 
0.7224 
0.7272 
0.1330 
0.1704 
0.0652 
0.4486 
ROE -283.29 1443.7 78.69 14.90 
LnActif 4.5454 13.1875 1.6073 8.7061 
Endt 0.0001 0.6284 0.5263 0.3367 
RemTot (Euro) 0 10393267 1075352 1549432 
RemFix (Euro) 0 2729179 417754 764632 
Bonus (Euro) 0 8717872 805327 745497 
Binary Variables  Frequency Proportion  
Duality 
0 212 54.64  
1 176 45.36  
AttSo 
0 54 13.92  
1 334 86.08  
 
In addition, we conducted tests of mean difference for the purposes of a thorough study of the 
characteristics of our sample. These tests are shown in Panels A and B of Table 3. The first test is to divide the 
sample into two groups of companies. The first group includes companies with a value of total compensation above 
the average of the entire sample. The second group includes companies with a total value of compensation below the 
average. We subsequently changed our dependent variable (total compensation) into a dichotomous variable equal to 
1 if the firm pays its executives with a value higher than its average value and 0 otherwise. Then, we analyzed the 
difference in averages for the different variables representing the shareholding structure of one subgroup to 
another. The average difference test used is a parametric test (student t). 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that companies distributing high earnings (above the average) have a 
concentration (Conc ) relatively lower than companies that pay lower than average. The mean differences are 
significant at the 5% level between the two groups of companies. This result is confirmed by measuring the gap 
between ownership and control (Discrepancy).  
 
Table 3 shows that firms with small gap between ownership and voting (Discrepancy) pay their executives 
large amount. Regarding the share of institutional investors, the results show that companies that pay high 
compensation to executives are those who have a strong presence of institutional investors. The differences were 
significant between the two groups at the 1% level. As for the variables representing the characteristics of the board, 
the mean difference tests show that firms with high earnings have more independent directors and opt less for a dual 
function CEO and chairman of the board than firms in the second group. Finally, large firms are those that distribute 
a higher salary compared to their smaller counterparts. 
  
Panel B of Table 3, meanwhile, presents tests of mean difference between companies distributing stock 
options to their executives and those choosing not to use this type of managerial incentive indexed to 
performance. The results show that companies awarding stock options have a concentration (Conc), but rather low 
institutional ownership (Invins) compared to firms not awarding stock options. The mean differences are significant 
at the 1% level between the two groups of companies. Similarly, we note that the percentage of independent 
directors is higher in firms opting for stock option programs.  
 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
  
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of estimating regression models for total compensation (LnRemTot), fixed 
compensation (LnRemFix) and variable compensation (LnBonus) represented by the first three models of each of 
equations (1) and (2). 
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The estimation results show no evidence of the existence of a significant effect of the proportion of shares 
held by the controlling shareholder (Conc) and the gap between ownership and voting (Discrepancy) on the three 
dependent variables of our research. However, we note a negative and significant effect of concentration of 
ownership, as measured by the Herfindahl index and total executive compensation. This allows us to accept our first 
hypothesis. This result is similar to that found in previous studies found in other contexts such as Elston and 
Goldberg (2003) , Lambert et al. (1993) and Core et al. (1999) and Cyert et al. (2002 ) and Veliyath Cordeiro 
(2003), Ozkan (2007), and Haid and Yurtoglu (2006). Thus, it appears that in the French context, ownership is more 
concentrated and more controlled by majority shareholder. Indeed, the use of high compensation to align the 
interests of shareholders with those of managers is reduced. 
  
Table 3. Tests Of Mean Difference: Average Total Compensation And Allocation Of Stock Options 
 Test Of Difference In Means 
 Average Total Compensation Granting Of Stock Options 
 
Average 
Earnings 
Average T-Test 
Award Of 
Stock Options 
Average T-Test 
Concent 
1 0.3166 
2.1345 ** 
1 0.3297 
3.4978 *** 
0 0.3658 0 0.4407 
Discrepancy 
1 0.0105 
4.3143 *** 
1 0.0255 
-0.6843 
0 0.0351 0 0.0203 
Herfindahl 
1 0.3393 
-1.1167 
1 0.2632 
0.1695 
0 0.2105 0 0.2739 
KalFlle 
1 0.0811 
1.6020 
1 0.1003 
-1.4598 
0 0.1076 0 0.0729 
KalDirig 
1 0.0643 
0044 
1 0.0634 
0.5682 
0 0.0649 0 0.0730 
Invins 
1 0.4170 
-3.1832 *** 
1 0.3832 
3078 *** 
0 0.3300 0 0.2764 
IndCA 
1 0.4653 
-2.2504 ** 
1 0.4518 
3368 *** 
0 0.4266 0 0.3864 
Duality 
1 0.3496 
3.6164 *** 
1 0.4384 
1.5937 
0 0.5312 0 0.5555 
OE 
1 14.4734 
0.1477 
1 15.4282 
-0.4304 
0 15.5245 0 12.9611 
LnActif 
1 9.6004 
10720 *** 
1 8.6227 
2.8139 ** 
0 8.0528 0 9.2104 
Endt 
1 0.3512 
-0.4118 
1 0.3425 
-1.0100 
0 0.3270 0 0.3045 
 
Panel A of this table presents the average difference tests by dividing the sample according to the variable 
average total compensation (= 1 if the total compensation paid by the company is above the average total 
compensation of the entire sample). Panel B of this table presents the average difference tests by dividing the sample 
according to the variable allocation of stock options (= 1 if the company awards stock options). ***, **, *: statistics 
are significant to the respective thresholds of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The presence of a negative effect of the concentration of ownership on total compensation can be explained 
by the fact that the controlling shareholder is a guarantee of security of minority interests in a concentrated structure 
(Morck et al. (1988)). To this end, and as an additional control mechanism of leadership, ownership concentration 
replaces executive compensation. The direction of this relationship can reinforce the arguments of agency theory 
and the alignment argument that shareholders' interests are aligned with those of the managers by the award of high 
compensation. In this situation, a higher level of compensation or compensation policy based on incentives elements 
will be recommended to increase the effort of managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Furthermore, the negative 
relationship between executive compensation and share ownership concentration detected in our empirical analysis 
can also be explained by the fact that the probability of removal of the manager is high in a business where the 
capital is held by a limited number of shareholders. Thus, to prevent their replacement by others, the managers of 
companies will be encouraged to align shareholder expectations by limiting, for example, its discretions in 
compensation (Kaplan (1994)). 
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Regarding the type of shareholder, it appears that the share of managers (KalDirig) influences positively 
and significantly the level of total and fixed compensation. Indeed, the identity of shareholders may have major 
implications for executive compensation. This result confirms our fourth hypothesis. In other words, this result 
supports the hypothesis that assumes rooting managers benefit from their holding of a significant fraction of the 
capital to force administrators to tolerate the payment of a total fixed compensation (Barak et al. (2011)). 
  
The proportion of institutional investors (Invins) has no significant impact on the three variables 
representing the level of managerial compensation. In addition, Table 5 shows that family ownership (KalFlle) 
negatively affects variable executive compensation. This result rejects the third hypothesis of this work as well as 
the assumption of expropriation of private benefits. 
 
Indeed, it appears that family members are more involved in the management of the firm, thus affecting 
executive compensation by reducing their excessive withdrawals. 
  
Tables 4 and 5 show a negative and significant effect of the proportion of independent directors (IndCA). 
This effect persists in all the equations of the two models. Indeed, it turns out that in the French context, the 
presence of independent directors on the board reduces the incentive to use high earnings (total, fixed and variable) 
to ensure alignment of interests of executives with those of shareholders. These two mechanisms of governance are 
now substitutes according to our results (Ben Amoako-Adu (2011)). 
 
Also, we note a positive effect of the variable (Duality) on variable compensation (bonus). Indeed, 
combining the functions of CEO and chairman of the board tends to increase the variable and total share of 
executive compensation. In this case, the president and top director wields great power in the selection of directors 
and then in fixing their compensation. Thus, he can freely impose his compensation. 
 
Table 4. Estimation Results Of The Regressions (Models 1 To 3 In The 1st Equation) 
This table presents the results of panel data regressions for our sample. ***, **, *: statistics are significant to the respective 
thresholds of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
LnRemTot LnRemFix Bonus Ln 
 
Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Constant 14.0524 *** 45.31 13.4966 *** 57.89 14.3956 *** 22.17 
Concent 0.1373 0.71 0.0248 0.17 0.3376 0.74 
Inv Ins -0.0272 -0 .. 27 0.0531 0.70 -0.0665 -0.30 
Kal Dirig 0.6593 ** 2.34 0.4499 ** 2.12 0.7493 1.18 
IndCA -0.4982 ** -2.07 -0.4482 ** -2.48 -1.6986 *** -2.75 
Duality 0.0039 -0.07 0.0645 1.49 0.2018 1.59 
LnActif 0.0137 0.39 0.0060 0.23 -0.0687 -0.69 
ROE -0.0006 *** -2.73 -0.0005 *** -3.06 -0.0006 -1.21 
Endt 0.0077 0.16 -0.0081 -0.23 -0.0107 -0.11 
F-test  
9.66 *** 10.04 *** 5.43 *** 
0.000 0 0.00 00 0.000 0 
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Table 5. Estimation Results Of The Regressions (Models 1 To 3 In The 2nd Equation) 
This table presents the results of panel data regressions for our sample. ***, **, *: statistics are significant to the respective 
thresholds of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  LnRemTot LnRemFix Bonus Ln 
  Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Constant 14.1109 *** 46.04 13.5037 *** 88.96 14.5263 *** 22.97 
Discrepancy -0.8694 -1.13 0.6050 1.31 -0.2781 -0.16 
Herfindahl -0.0286 *** -2.73 -0.0008 -0.28 -0.0384 -0.85 
Kalflle -0.0904 -0.64 0.0705 0.37 -0.8394 ** -2.24 
IndCA -0.4156 * -1.82 -0.4912 ** -2.46 -1.6913 *** -2.68 
Duality 0.0372 0.60 0.0559 1.46 0.3439 ** 2.56 
LnActif 0.0144 0.41 0.0118 0.74 - 0. 0659 -0.94 
ROE - 0.0006 ** - 2.18 - 0.0005 *** - 3.83 -0.0006 -1.31 
Endt 0.0047 0.29 - 0.0044 - 0.29 -0.0012 -0.01 
F-test 
2.02 ** 3.02 ** 2.54 ** 
0.0447 0.0029 0.0112 
 
Regarding the other control variables, it appears that neither the size of the company nor its debt level 
significantly influence executive compensation. Also note the existence of a negative and significant effect on 
performance, as measured by return on equity (ROE), by the level of total and fixed compensation. This result 
contradicts those found in the literature (Kato et al. (2006)). Such a negative impact can be explained by the fact that 
firms with low profitability have more interest to pay the top executives who may be interested. So these companies 
would offer higher salaries to attract the best talent to drain their performance (Cheng and Firth (2006). 
Table 6 shows the results of a logistic regression examining the effect of the ownership structure of French 
firms on the decision to award options (Attso) to managers, controlling for the effect of variables characterizing the 
Board, size, performance and debt (Model 4 of each of equations 1 and 2). 
  
The results in Table 6 show that firms with concentrated ownership (Conc) have little tendency to grant 
stock purchase options to their executives. This strengthens the result previously found and reinforces the idea that 
the controlling shareholder is a substitute for compensation based on performance.  
 
Table 6 also reports that institutional shareholders (Invins) significantly promote the use of share purchase 
option plans. This result is in line with the thesis of expropriation, which states that institutional investors use 
tunneling mechanisms for appropriating private benefits through the compensation mechanism of buying 
options. Such shareholders may thus be required to use their power in the firm to assign private benefits of control 
through the options to purchase shares. Similarly, this positive impact can be explained by the fact that institutional 
investors tend to have a myopic behavior by encouraging managers to increase business performance by distributing 
share purchase options. Possible complementarity may also exist between these two governance mechanisms. 
  
On variables representing the board, we note the appearance of a positive and significant effect on the 
percentage of independent directors. This result is contradictory to that found above for variable pay level. Finally, 
we note that small firms are trying to give more emphasis to option plans in order to ensure alignment between the 
interests of the manager and those of shareholders. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results Of The Regressions Of Granting Stock Options (Model 4 Equations 1  And 2 ) 
 This table shows the regression results of a panel data model of stock options for our sample. ***, **, *: statistics are significant 
to the respective thresholds of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
  Coef Z Coef Z 
Constant 2.2800 *** 4.58 1.7580 3.66 
Concent -0.9679 *** -3.01 
  Herfindahl 
  
0.0156 0.37 
Discrepancy 
  
1.1094 0.67 
InvIns 0.5835 * 1.71 
  Kal Dirig -0.2940 -0.55 
  Kal Flle 
  
0.6469 1.19 
IndCA 1.6042 *** 3.36 1.7821 *** 3.69 
Duality -0.2527 -1.50 -0.3952 ** -2.24 
LnActif -0.1813 *** -3.99 -0.1554 *** -3.47 
ROE -0.0001 -0.17 0.0000 0.12 
Endt 0.1307 1.03 0.1312 1.15 
Wald chi2 
 
44.67 *** 33.01 *** 
0.0000 0.0001 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of ownership structure (concentration, discepancy) on executive 
compensation (compensation level and allocation of stock options to shares) while controlling for some variables 
characterizing the Board of Directors (composition and dual functions), performance (yield of equity), size and 
debt. This article is an extension of the existing literature on compensation policy. To our knowledge, no research 
has addressed the issue as we did. This is even more so in that the empirical investigation of this research relates to a 
sample of French companies listed on the SBF 120 index over the period of four years from 2007 to 2010. In the 
empirical part, we considered various models to study the characteristics of ownership structure, namely the 
concentration of ownership, and the discrepancy and type of shareholder (managers, family, institutional investor). 
  
The main findings coming from this study do not all converg with previous work on international 
contexts. The results allowed us to conclude that the concentration of ownership negatively affects both the level of 
total executive compensation and the probability of using incentive plans based on options to purchase shares. This 
result suggests the existence of a substitution effect between ownership concentration and managerial compensation 
policy. Indeed, the majority shareholders are considered to be a guarantee of safety permitting the protection of the 
interests of minority shareholders.  
 
The use of stock option incentive plans and excessive compensation in this kind of structure is very 
pronounced. This result thus strengthens the alignment hypothesis. Moreover, the results of our research show no 
evidence of the existence of a significant effect of the difference between ownership and voting on policies of 
managerial compensation. 
  
The type of shareholders also seems to impact executive compensation differently. Indeed, the results show 
no significant effect of institutional ownership on the level of compensation. However, it turns out that such 
shareholders encourage the use of incentive plans based on options to purchase shares. Similarly, our results show 
that the share of managers positively and significantly influences the level of their total and fixed 
compensation. This result confirms the hypothesis that assumes rooting managers benefit from their holdings of a 
significant fraction of the capital to force administrators to tolerate the payment of a total high fixed 
compensation. Similarly, it appears that family ownership negatively affects variable executive compensation. This 
result confirms the hypothesis of alignment of private benefits. Indeed,  family members become more involved in 
the management of the firm, thus affecting executive compensation by reducing their excessive withdrawals. 
  
Moreover, it turns out that in the French context, the presence of independent directors on the board 
reduces the incentive to award high salaries (total, fixed and variable) and promotes the adoption of incentive-based 
options plans to purchase shares in order to ensure an alignment of interests of executives with those of 
shareholders. Similarly, the results of our investigation show that combining the functions of CEO and chairman of 
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the board tends to increase the variable portion of executive compensation. In this case, the president and top 
director wields great power in the selection of directors and then in fixing their compensation. Regarding the other 
control variables, it appears that neither the size of the company nor its debt levels significantly influence the level 
of executive compensation. In contrast, we find that small firms tend to choose more incentive plans based on 
options to purchase shares. Finally, we detect the existence of a negative and significant effect of the return on 
equity on total and fixed compensation. 
  
In short, the results found in this article may be an extension of the existing literature. Identifying the 
determinants of compensation policy may be relevant in the design of managerial compensation contracts. This is 
especially important in a crisis where every business must develop the best ways to survive and perform. 
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